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Forced Obstetrical Intervention:  
The Role of Religion and Culture and the  
Woman’s Autonomous Choice 
Gina L. Gribow* 
I. INTRODUCTION
The significance our society places on an individual’s autonomy and 
right to bodily integrity seems unparalleled as it has been repeatedly noted 
that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the 
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, 
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”1  This right to control 
one’s own person applies equally to every individual, and thus is an 
inherent right held by pregnant women.  In the medical context, a pregnant 
woman’s right to decide what will be done with her body flows from the 
doctrine of informed consent, as she must agree to the proposed medical 
treatment.2 
Though a pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity is supported by 
various constitutional amendments,3 many lawsuits have arisen in the 
medical field challenging a woman’s ability to refuse specific medical 
treatment when the treatment is deemed necessary to improve or save the 
life of the fetus.  Often, religion and culture play a central role in either 
establishing a basis for why the woman refuses the treatment, or 
establishing the context that ultimately leads to forced obstetrical 
intervention.  Historically, it seems that when religion or culture is heavily 
intertwined with the woman’s decision to forgo medical treatment, courts 
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1. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
2. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, Autonomy & Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY & 
PRACTICE 55, 57 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2009). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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have more strongly favored the interests of the state in protecting the 
unborn fetus.  Though in recent decisions it appears that courts are 
beginning to place greater emphasis on a woman’s inherent right to 
personal autonomy and bodily integrity, there is still a lack of a general 
consensus in regard to which rights should be valued more highly. 
This paper analyzes the rights of pregnant women to refuse specific 
medical treatment, and argues that these women become more vulnerable 
to forced obstetrical intervention when religion or culture play a central 
role in the woman’s decision.  The paper proceeds in eight parts. Part II 
explores the role that informed consent plays in a pregnant woman’s 
personal and informed decision to accept or refuse medical treatment.  Part 
III examines key protections of a woman’s right to bodily integrity 
grounded in the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution. Part IV looks at the impact of religion in a pregnant woman’s 
decision to forgo medical treatment, and specifically focuses on Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and their aversion to blood transfusions.  Part V discusses the 
effect of culture on a pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity, 
particularly looking at instances of forced obstetrical intervention for 
Somali women in the United States, and pregnant women who lack access 
to comprehensive reproductive health services on the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Reservation.  Part VI analyzes the latest major case on this topic, 
providing a perspective on how courts are currently addressing maternal-
fetal conflict.  Part VII suggests that this area of law is difficult to 
effectively analyze due to inconsistent court decisions and a lack of 
available data.  Part VIII offers proposed solutions and conclusions.   
II. THE ROLE OF INFORMED CONSENT AND PERSONAL
AUTONOMY IN A PREGNANT WOMAN’S CHOICE TO
ACCEPT OR REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
Informed consent plays a central role in a pregnant woman’s decision
to comply with or refuse medical treatment.  The doctrine of informed 
consent encompasses various meanings, and includes the:  
legal rules that prescribe behaviors for physicians and other 
healthcare professionals in their interactions with patients and 
provide for penalties, under given circumstances, if physicians 
deviate from those expectations; . . . an ethical doctrine, rooted in 
our society’s cherished value of autonomy, that promotes patients’ 
right of self-determination regarding medical treatment; and . . . an 
interpersonal process whereby these parties interact with each other 
to select an appropriate course of medical care.4 
4. JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY & CLINICAL PRACTICE 3
(2d ed. 2001). 
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Informed consent generally encompasses the idea that decisions about 
the medical care a person receives should be made in a collaborative 
manner between the patient and their physician.5  Thus, from the 
perspective of a pregnant woman, any medical treatment she receives 
should be the result of a mutual understanding between herself and her 
doctor. 
The ethical justification for informed consent originates from its 
promotion of autonomy and well-being.6  Informed consent is effectively 
an individual’s “autonomous authorization of a medical intervention or 
participation in research.”7  In order for an individual to authorize a 
procedure or treatment through an act of informed and voluntary consent, a 
person must do more than merely show agreement or comply with a 
proposal by a doctor.8  Informed consent only occurs if a patient or subject, 
“with substantial understanding, and in the absence of substantial control 
by others, intentionally authorizes a professional to do something.”9  In this 
respect, a pregnant woman who unequivocally refuses to have a medical 
procedure, such as a cesarean or a blood transfusion, should not be 
compelled to undergo that procedure, as it would effectively violate the 
spirit of informed consent.   
The heavy focus on autonomy within the doctrine of informed consent 
reflects the importance of bodily integrity, which has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court for over a hundred years.  In 1891, Justice Gray affirmed 
the significance of bodily integrity through his opinion in Union Pacific 
Railway Company v. Botsford, quoting Judge Cooley, “[t]he right to one’s 
person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be let alone.”10  
Justice Cardozo further expounded upon this idea in relation to informed 
consent in 1914, declaring “[e]very human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a 
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits 
an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”11  The assertions of both 
Justice Gray and Justice Cardozo are illustrative of the personal right to 
control one’s body, which is a right that should apply just as much to a 
pregnant woman as any other individual. 
5. BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 11.
6. Id.
7. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 2, at 57.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
11. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129–30 (1914).
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III. KEY CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF A PREGNANT
WOMAN’S RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY 
A. RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT SUPPORTED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The autonomous right of every individual to refuse medical treatment
has been upheld in various Supreme Court decisions, and is directly 
supported by the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no State 
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”12  In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court 
relied upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to affirm 
the right of competent individuals to exercise their right to refuse medical 
procedures.13  In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor highlighted the 
individual liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause, stating, 
“[b]ecause our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of 
physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state 
incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”14  Thus, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment unmistakably protects a pregnant woman’s right to accept or 
refuse certain medical treatment based upon personal beliefs.  
B. RIGHT OF PRIVACY GRANTED IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
An individual’s right to privacy is explicitly grounded in the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,15 and ultimately protects an 
individual’s right to bodily integrity.16  In Superintendent of Belchertown 
State School v. Saikewicz, the Court avowed the notion of the right to 
privacy, stating: 
arising from the same regard for human dignity and self-
determination, is the unwritten constitutional right of privacy found 
in the penumbra of specific guaranties of the Bill of Rights.  As 
this constitutional guaranty reaches out to protect the freedom of a 
woman to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions, so it 
encompasses the right of a patient to preserve his or her right to 
privacy against unwanted infringements of bodily integrity in 
appropriate circumstances.17  
This declaration supports the idea that a pregnant woman, in the role of 
a patient, has an implicit right to refuse unwelcomed physical intrusions by 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
14. Id. at 287.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168, n.2 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
17. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass.
1977). 
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a doctor.  Furthermore, a pregnant woman’s interest in protecting her body 
is safeguarded by certain expectations of privacy found within the Fourth 
Amendment, specifically “the individual’s legitimate expectations that in 
certain places and at certain times he has ‘the right to be let alone—the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.’”18 
C. RIGHT TO DETERMINE ONE’S DESTINY ESTABLISHED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Along with a right to privacy, the United States Constitution protects
an individual’s right to religious freedom.19  The First Amendment 
provides that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”20  The Supreme Court has 
thus explicitly recognized two concepts embodied in the Free Exercise 
Clause: the freedom to have a specific religious belief and the freedom to 
act in accordance with that religious belief.21 
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court affirmed the belief-action 
dichotomy intrinsic in the First Amendment, which signaled a trend that the 
Court would continue to protect certain religiously motivated conduct from 
government interference.22  In Cantwell, the justices unanimously 
maintained that a Connecticut statute denied the petitioner his religious 
liberty without due process of law, thereby violating both his First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.23  The Court further expanded upon the 
importance of protecting the right to religious freedom in In re Estate of 
Brooks.24  In that case, the Court held that an adult may refuse medical 
treatment for religious reasons, even if the decision may seem “unwise, 
foolish, or ridiculous.”25  In line with this reasoning, pregnant women 
thereby hold the right to decline medical treatment based upon personal 
religious beliefs, as that right is safeguarded by the First Amendment of the 
Constitution. 
18. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
23. Id. at 305.
24. In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E. 2d 435, 442 (1965).
25. Id. at 442.
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IV. THE ROLE THAT RELIGION PLAYS IN A PREGNANT
WOMAN’S DECISION TO COMPLY WITH MEDICAL
PROCEDURES 
A. JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES’ AVERSION TO BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
1. The Religious Rationale
Jehovah’s Witnesses are a unique challenge to the medical community
because they are bound by religious belief to refuse blood and blood 
products,26 which ultimately complicates medical decisions for pregnant 
women.  Even though Jehovah’s Witnesses accept medical and surgical 
treatment, they strongly believe that blood transfusions are forbidden based 
upon Biblical passages, such as the passage from Genesis stating, “[o]nly 
flesh with its soul—its blood—you must not eat,”27 and the passage from 
Acts stating, “[a]bstain from . . . fornication and from what is strangled and 
from blood.”28  While these Biblical verses are not written in explicit 
medical terms, “[w]itnesses view them as ruling out transfusion of whole 
blood, packed RBC’s, and plasma, as well as WBC and platelet 
administration.”29  According to Witnesses’ religious understanding, 
though, the use of specific components of blood is not expressly prohibited, 
and therefore it is up to each individual to make the decision whether or not 
they will choose to accept them.30  
2. Early Cases Involving Pregnant Jehovah’s Witnesses Refusing
Blood Transfusions: The Triumph of State Interests
Though recent decisions involving the actual rights of pregnant 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in medical decisions seem to be grounded in the 
autonomy of the individual, early cases are reflective of the notion that the 
religious interests of Jehovah’s Witnesses are trumped by other interests 
held by the state.  In the 1964 case Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial 
Hospital v. Anderson, a hospital sought the authority to administer blood 
transfusions to a pregnant woman who was opposed to having the 
transfusions due to her religious convictions as a Jehovah’s Witness.31  The 
court ultimately held that the unborn child was entitled to the protection of 
the law, and that an order would be made to ensure that that woman would 
receive blood transfusions if the physician in charge at the time made the 
qualified determination that blood transfusions were necessary to save the 
26. J. Lowell Dixon & M. Gene Smalley, Jehovah’s Witnesses: The Surgical/Ethical
Challenge, 246 JAMA 2471, 2471 (1981). 
27. Genesis 9:4 (Jehovah’s Witnesses New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures).
28. Acts 15:20 (Jehovah’s Witnesses New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures).
29. Dixon & Smalley, supra note 26, at 2471.
30. Id.
31. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 537 (N.J.
1964). 
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woman’s life or the life of her child.32  In reaching this conclusion, the 
court relied upon previous decisions that emphasized that the concern of 
the state for the welfare of an infant justified blood transfusions 
notwithstanding the objection of its parents who were also of the Jehovah’s 
Witness faith.33  Moreover, in the case Smith v. Brennan, the same court 
had held that a child could sue for injuries that were negligently inflicted 
upon it prior to birth.34  Based on these decisions, the court was satisfied 
that the unborn child was assured protection by the law, and since the 
“welfare of the child and the mother are so intertwined and inseparable that 
it would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them with 
respect to the sundry factual patterns which may develop,” blood 
transfusions should be administered to the mother if it is necessary to save 
her life or that of the child.35  
Twenty years following the decision in Raleigh, the Supreme Court in 
New York delivered a similar opinion in In re Jamaica.36  In that case, a 
hospital sought an order to compel a woman who was eighteen weeks 
pregnant and in critical condition to have a blood transfusion.37  The 
woman had previously refused the transfusion based on her beliefs as a 
Jehovah’s Witness even though the procedure had been deemed necessary 
to stabilize her condition and ultimately save the life of her unborn child.38 
The Supreme Court held that the patient’s interest in exercising her 
religious beliefs was not sufficient to override the state’s significant interest 
in protecting the life of a midterm fetus, which the court classified as a 
human being in need of protection.39  The Justice who authored this 
opinion noted that although he recognized that:  
[T]he fetus in this case is not yet viable, and that the state’s interest
in protecting its life would be less than ‘compelling’ in the context
of the abortion cases, this is not such a case.  In this case, the state
has a highly significant interest in protecting the life of a mid-term
fetus, which outweighs the patient’s right to refuse a blood
transfusion on religious grounds.40
Thus, early court decisions that involved the autonomy rights of 
pregnant Jehovah’s Witnesses were grounded in the states’ interest in the 
protection of the fetus.  
32. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp., 201 A.2d at 538.
33. Id.
34. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960).
35. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp., 201 A.2d at 538.
36. In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
37. Id. at 898.
38. In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
39. Id. at 899–900.
40. Id. at 900.
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3. In re Brown: The Triumph of Personal Autonomy and Liberty
In a 1997 case that addressed the issue of balancing the rights of a
pregnant Jehovah’s Witness who refused medical treatment based on her 
religious convictions against the state’s substantial interest in the welfare of 
the viable fetus, an appellate court in Illinois declared that the paramount 
interest at stake was that of the liberty and personal autonomy of the 
woman.41  In re Brown involved a twenty-six-year-old woman Darlene 
Brown, a Jehovah’s Witness, who was thirty-four weeks and three days 
pregnant.42  During a procedure to remove a urethral mass, Brown lost 
more blood than her physicians had anticipated, causing her doctor to order 
a blood transfusion.43  Brown, who was fully conscious and alert at the time 
the blood arrived, refused the blood, noting that she was a Jehovah’s 
Witness.44  Since the doctors believed that Brown competently refused the 
transfusion, they finished the surgery using other techniques to control the 
bleeding.45  Following the surgery, Brown had an extremely low level of 
hemoglobin and although Brown’s doctor tried various alternative medical 
procedures, her hemoglobin level continued to drop.46  At the time, her 
doctor was of the opinion that if she did not have the blood transfusion, 
then her chance of survival, along that with that of the fetus, was only five 
percent.47 
On account of Brown’s refusal to have a blood transfusion, the State 
filed a petition for adjudication of wardship as well as a motion for the 
temporary custody of Brown’s fetus.48  The trial court granted the State’s 
petition and provided the hospital administrator with the temporary custody 
of Brown’s fetus, thereby conferring upon the administrator the right to 
consent to a blood transfusion should one of the attending physicians deem 
it necessary.49  In the end, the hospital made the decision to proceed with 
the blood transfusion, even though Brown adamantly resisted.50  Once it 
had been established that Brown had given birth to a healthy baby boy, the 
court vacated the temporary custody order, and the case was closed.51 
Nonetheless, the appellate court in the First District in Illinois came to 
the opposite conclusion, relying on decisions in Stallman v. Youngquist and 
In re Baby Boy Doe.52  In Stallman, the court held that a pregnant woman 
41. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill. 1997).










52. Id. at 405.
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owes no legally cognizable duty to her developing fetus, as a fetus cannot 
have superior rights to that of its mother.53  Expanding upon the reasoning 
in Stallman, the Baby Boy Doe court determined that the “Illinois courts 
should not engage in a balancing of the maternal and fetal rights such that 
‘a woman’s competent choice in refusing medical treatment as invasive as 
a cesarean section during her pregnancy must be honored, even in 
circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.’”54 
Furthermore, the court highlighted that a “woman’s right to refuse invasive 
medical treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and 
religious liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy.”55 
Though the opinion in Brown relies heavily upon the arguments 
established in In re Baby Boy Doe, it is important to note that the court 
departs from In re Baby Boy Doe’s suggestion that a blood transfusion 
merely constitutes a “relatively noninvasive and risk-free procedure.”56  
The Brown court found that a blood transfusion is, in fact, an invasive 
medical procedure that directly interrupts a competent adult’s bodily 
integrity.57  Thus, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared that Brown should 
not have been compelled to undergo the blood transfusion for the benefit of 
her viable fetus, thereby upholding a pregnant woman’s right to refuse 
medical treatment based upon religious beliefs.   
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF IN RE BROWN AND OBSERVATIONS REGARDING
THE WAY RELIGION IMPACTS OBSTETRICAL INTERVENTION
The decision in In re Brown is monumental not only because it
established a new precedent for a line of cases in Illinois on the subject of a 
woman’s right to personal autonomy and bodily integrity, but also because 
no other appellate court at the time had held that a pregnant woman had the 
right to refuse a blood transfusion, particularly due to religious reasons. 
While the decision is not binding upon any other state outside of Illinois, it 
is likely that the principles enunciated in the Brown decision will be relied 
upon by other appellate courts.  
Despite the laudable decision in Brown, however, an analysis of the 
few decisions that have been published in this line of cases suggests that a 
woman’s religious beliefs may ultimately make the woman more 
vulnerable to obstetrical intervention.  As it was not until 1997 that a court 
recognized a woman’s right to refuse medical treatment due to religious 
reasons, it seems physicians and courts in these types of cases are inclined 
to view a woman’s refusal of specific medical treatment as being grounded 
solely in religion, as opposed to personal autonomy.  Although this theory 
53. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ill. 1988).
54. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. 1994).
55. Id. at 332.
56. Id. at 333.
57. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 405.
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is not explicitly stated in any recent opinions, it should be noted that “deep 
religious discord has been part of America’s social DNA”58 and, therefore, 
it is possible that a general lack of understanding or acceptance for certain 
religions has served as the driving force behind medical court-orders.  
V. THE ROLE THAT CULTURE PLAYS IN AFFECTING A
PREGNANT WOMAN’S RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY
A. SOMALI WOMEN’S AVERSION TO CESAREANS
1. Cultural Norms that Shape Somali Women’s Views Regarding
Cesareans
Similar to the way in which religion has caused pregnant women to be 
more vulnerable to certain medical decisions made by their physicians and 
the courts, cultural norms have also played a role in making women more 
susceptible to obstetrical intervention.  This has particularly been 
evidenced through cases involving Somali women.  Unlike Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who refuse to accept blood transfusions, Somali women have a 
general aversion to cesareans, which seems to be grounded in their cultural 
beliefs.  
Somali women place a significant emphasis on pregnancy due to their 
religious beliefs, and feel that pregnancy is a blessing from God.59  In 
accordance with these beliefs, many Somali women refuse cesareans as 
they believe that cesareans may impede subsequent pregnancies and lead to 
death.60  The general fear of maternal death is readily substantiated by the 
fact that the maternal mortality rate for Somali women is among the highest 
in the world.61  Data gathered by the World Health Organization indicates 
that in 2006 it was estimated that out of one hundred thousand live births, 
one thousand six hundred Somali women would die from childbirth.62  
The high maternal mortality rate is reflective of the severe lack of 
adequate medical care for Somali women.  In Somalia, two-thirds of 
women receive no prenatal care, and less than a third have a professional 
birth attendant present during birth.63  In a study involving thirty-four 
Somali women which focused on the general resistance to common 
58. Kenneth C. Davis, America’s True History of Religious Tolerance, SMITHSONIAN, 1,
4 (Oct. 2010), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/Americas-True-
History-of-Religious-Tolerance.html.  
59. E-Newsletter, KANSAS PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, (Feb. 2006), http://www.kpha.
us/documents/newsletters/2006WinterNewslet.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) [hereinafter 
KANSAS PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION]. 
60. Elizabeth Brown et al., “They Get a C-Section . . . They Gonna Die”: Somali
Women’s Fears of Obstetrical Interventions in the United States, 21 J. TRANSCULTURAL 
NURSING 220, 224 (2010). 
61. Id. at 220.
62. Country Statistics: Somalia, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://rho.emro.who.int/
rhodata/?theme=country&vid=18300# (last visited Sept. 2, 2012). 
63. Brown et al., supra note 60, at 220–21.
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prenatal and obstetrical intervention techniques, a young woman stated, 
“They have [seizures in Africa] a lot. [Seizures] cause a contraction and 
[the woman] don’t have a doctor.  The baby is not coming, and they don’t 
have any c-section.  If [the baby] die or the mother die, that is what 
happens.”64  This statement reinforces the concept that cesareans are not 
routine medical procedures for Somali women, as whatever may happen to 
the child or the mother is believed to be God’s will.65   
The study also revealed that most Somali women delivered at home, 
and only went to a hospital if there were complications, which is another 
prominent reason why Somali women tend to express fears of dying from 
cesareans.66  Typically, Somali women only seek hospital care after three to 
four days of labor, and only accept obstetrical intervention, such as 
cesareans, in rare cases of prolonged labor and when other methods have 
failed.67  Furthermore, the predominant belief among the female 
participants in the study was that doctors in the United States heavily push 
for surgery, as opposed to natural birth.68  One of the women from the 
study corroborated this view, stating: 
Back home with a midwife, if the kid has a big head and he can’t 
come out, [midwife] makes a cut and the kid comes out. [Somali 
women] believe here that [doctors] just want to do the surgery. 
[Doctors] don’t want to help the baby come out. Back home [if 
women] are in labor even for two days, they still have to wait until 
the baby comes out.  But over here, [doctors] think it’s an 
emergency and they just do the c-section; they don’t wait until the 
baby come out.69 
2. Reported Instances of Court-Ordered Cesareans for Somali Women
in the United States
It is difficult to find actual court orders or case law regarding instances 
of forced obstetrical intervention with Somali women in the United States, 
particularly as most of the court orders appear to be under seal and are not 
accessible to the public.70  Additionally, doctors and hospital employees are 
unable to discuss the cases due to potential violations of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).71 
64. Brown et al., supra note 60, at 222.





70. See discussion infra Part VII.
71. E-mail from Kristi Boldt, M.D., Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Mayo Clinic, to
author (Feb. 14, 2012, 12:41 PST) (on file with author). 
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Nevertheless, accounts of court-ordered cesareans have surfaced through 
studies that have gathered Somali women into focus groups.72  
At the American Public Health Association’s 133rd Annual Meeting 
and Exposition in 2005,73 various accounts of court-ordered cesareans were 
described.  During a medical presentation of a Somali study, one of the 
presenters discussed an instance in which a Somali woman had recounted 
that she originally refused to be induced as she felt that “God-willing the 
baby would come when it was time,” yet was compelled to have a 
cesarean.74  A separate instance was additionally described in which 
another woman also initially refused a cesarean based upon her 
convictions, but was eventually ordered to have the cesarean by her 
doctors.75  Following the cesarean, the women’s baby was taken away from 
her as she was deemed to be an “unfit” mother on account of her original 
refusal to have the cesarean.76  
3. Observations Regarding the Differences in Beliefs that Exist
Between American Physicians and Their Somali Patients
The purpose behind forming focus groups specifically tailored to 
Somali women and their pregnancy was to identify the reasons for the 
differences in beliefs and opinions that exist between American physicians 
and their Somali patients.77  As Somali women are not native to the United 
States, their cultural views are not well understood, nor do they appear to 
be well respected.  The general lack of understanding of the Somali culture 
displayed by American physicians may lead to Somali women feeling 
helpless in resisting medical treatment.  Thus, though documented accounts 
of forced obstetrical intervention with Somali women in the United States 
have been challenging to find, it is readily apparent that the cultural beliefs 
of these women make them vulnerable to certain American medical 
practices.   
B. THE CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX RESERVATION: LACK OF REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH SERVICES ON THE RESERVATION AND COERCED INDUCED
LABOR
1. Allegations of Insufficient Reproductive Health Services and
Coerced Induced Labor
Analogous to the way that Somali women may feel powerless to 
challenge medical decisions in the United States based upon a difference in 
72. KANSAS PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, supra note 59.
73. Julka Almquist, MPH, Division of Epidemiology, Address at the American Public
Health Association’s 133rd Annual Meeting and Exposition (Dec. 12, 2005). 
74. E-mail from Mary Barger, Assistant Professor, Department of Family Health Care
Nursing to author (Jan. 30, 2012, 04:30 PST) (on file with author). 
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. KANSAS PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, supra note 59.
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cultural views, pregnant women on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation 
feel defenseless to challenge the terms of their labor and delivery which are 
dictated by Indian Health Services (IHS).78  For more than a decade, 
pregnant women who reside on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation 
have not only faced the burden of having to travel more than ninety miles 
for labor and delivery, since there is no birthing unit on the reservation, but 
have also been consistently induced without sufficient consideration.79  On 
account of the challenges faced by pregnant women on the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Reservation, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit against IHS on September 29, 
2010.80  The FOIA suit was filed in an effort to obtain information 
regarding the reproductive health care services available to women on the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation so that appropriate changes could be 
made to provide women with the services they need.81   
The actual complaint explicitly notes that IHS has failed to meet the 
United States government’s treaty obligations regarding providing 
appropriate health care services to American Indians and Alaska Natives.82 
Although IHS is entrusted with fulfilling certain duties to provide specific 
health care services, there has been a significant lack of comprehensive 
obstetrical care at any IHS facility on the reservation since 2001.83 
Moreover, though there had originally been plans to build a new birthing 
unit on the reservation, the plans never came to fruition.84  Since the 
birthing unit has not been built, the majority of pregnant women on the 
reservation who would be eligible for care under IHS are forced to travel 
ninety miles to a healthcare center in South Dakota for labor and delivery.85 
Due to poor road conditions, this trip can take over two hours.86  
In addition to the fact that women on the reservation are compelled to 
travel long distances for delivery, “some of these women report that they 
are being told they must forgo natural labor and delivery, and instead take 
medication to induce labor—with little or no notice, explanation, or 
counseling, and at a time selected exclusively by their doctor (sometimes 
even before their due date).”87  Since these women are beholden to IHS for 
medical services, they typically feel powerless to refuse to be induced on 
78. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1–2, ACLU v. Indian Health Serv. No. 10-07388
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the terms laid out by their physician.88  Furthermore, the fact that the 
physician authorizes the induction on his/her own terms leads to instances 
where families are not able to be present during delivery because of 
insufficient advance notification.89 
While labor, in other contexts, is sometimes induced for logistical 
reasons, no medical group or organization recommends mandatory 
inductions for rural women without taking into account their personal 
preferences or circumstances.90  This argument is asserted in the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ (ACOG) August 2009 clinical 
guidelines regarding inductions, which state that a patient should always be 
counseled regarding the indications for induction and the possible need for 
repeat induction, or cesarean delivery as a result.91  Additionally, ACOG 
recommends that at least twelve to eighteen hours of latent labor should be 
allowed before elective induction in order to reduce the risk of cesarean 
delivery.92   
2. The Outcome of the Lawsuit and Current Status for Pregnant
Women on the Reservation
The ACLU’s FOIA filing did not gain much momentum and the 
lawsuit did not lead to any actual changes in the way that pregnancies are 
handled on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation.93  Alexa Kolbi-
Molinas, the staff attorney who filed the complaint on behalf of the ACLU, 
claims that the only response she received from IHS was an IHS manual, 
which details IHS-specific policies and also includes procedural 
instructions.94  As there is no written policy in the manual that provides for 
comprehensive reproductive health services on a reservation, this proved to 
be a major contributing factor to the defeat of this lawsuit.95  Nevertheless, 
Kolbi-Molinas still believes that this issue is actionable since there is a 
treaty obligation to provide services.96  
Though no further actions are being filed at the moment, it is likely that 
this issue will be relitigated.97  The federal government does not have the 
right to deprive Native American women of the ability to make an 
informed and autonomous decision regarding their medical care based upon 
the fact that they live in a rural area and are obliged to rely on IHS for 
88. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 78, at 5.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Clinical Management Guidelines for Obstetrician-Gynecologists, ACOG PRAC.
BULL. (Comm. on Practice Bulletins—Obstetrics, The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2009, at 4. 
92. Id.
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health care.  The practice of coercing women to take medication to induce 
labor undoubtedly violates both a woman’s fundamental right to privacy 
and bodily integrity. 
VI. MOST RECENT CASE INVOLVING MATERNAL-FETAL
CONFLICT AND MEDICAL-DECISION MAKING DURING
PREGNANCY 
A. BURTON V. FLORIDA (2009)
There is still no consensus regarding the way courts treat cases that pit
a woman’s right to refuse medical treatment against the state’s interest in 
protecting fetal health.  The most recent decision in this line of cases, 
Burton v. Florida, surfaced in a Florida state court in March of 2009.98  In 
Burton, Samantha Burton, who was pregnant and who already had two 
children, voluntarily sought medical treatment after she developed 
complications during her twenty-fifth week of pregnancy.99  Her attending 
physician strongly recommended that she follow a course of care that 
would postpone her pregnancy, which included medication, inpatient 
monitored bed rest, and physician supervision of physical activity, 
smoking, and diet.100  Instead of following these recommendations, Ms. 
Burton sought to be discharged from the hospital, prompting the hospital to 
seek assistance from the state to attempt to force her to comply with the 
recommended form of care.101  In response, the state appointed a private 
lawyer to act as special assistant state attorney in the case, and the lawyer 
filed an emergency petition seeking judicial authorization to force Ms. 
Burton to comply with the recommended treatment.102  Later the same day, 
the court initiated an emergency hearing by telephone with Ms. Burton in 
which Ms. Burton represented herself from her hospital room without the 
assistance of counsel.103  Shortly following this telephone hearing, the court 
granted the state’s petition as the court reasoned that the state had parens 
patriae authority to ensure that children receive medical treatment that is 
necessary for the preservation of their life and health, and further that 
between a parent and a child, the ultimate welfare of the child is the 
controlling factor in any decision.104  
On account of the court’s decision to recognize the state’s parens 
patriae authority, Ms. Burton’s providers were authorized to bestow upon 
her the medical care and treatment that they deemed necessary to preserve 
98. Kate Wevers, Burton v. Florida: Maternal-Fetal Conflicts and Medical Decision
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the life and health of the unborn child.105  Within the context of appropriate 
medical treatment and care, the providers were permitted to mandate 
permanent bed rest, administer necessary medication, and ultimately 
perform a cesarean delivery a few days following the court’s order.106 
Following the cesarean, which resulted in a stillbirth, Ms. Burton 
promptly appealed the original court order.107  Even though the issue as it 
applied to Ms. Burton was moot, her appeal raised issues concerning the 
rights of pregnant women that are likely to reappear in future litigation.108 
In the appeal, The Florida District Court overruled the Burton trial court, 
effectively ruling that Ms. Burton’s rights had been violated when she was 
forced to remain hospitalized against her will after she disagreed with the 
prescribed treatment.109 In reaching its decision, the appellate court found 
that the trial court misapplied the law from M.N. v. Southern Baptist 
Hospital of Florida when it rested its decision upon the holding “that as 
between parent and child, the ultimate welfare of the child is the controlling 
factor.”110  Unlike Burton, M.N. did not involve the rights of a pregnant 
women, but rather a parents’ refusal of consent for a blood transfusion and 
chemotherapy for their son.111   
The appellate court in Burton further noted that “[t]he test to overcome 
a woman’s right to refuse medical intervention in her pregnancy is whether 
the state’s compelling state interest is sufficient to override the pregnant 
woman’s constitutional right to the control of her person, including her 
right to refuse medical treatment.”112  The compelling interest must be 
“narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to safeguard the 
rights of the individual,”113 and the state’s interest does not become 
compelling until viability.114  Thus, the court enunciated a strict test that 
must be met before restricting a woman’s freedom to personal autonomy, 
and since the state did not show any evidence of viability, the balancing 
test was not triggered.  
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BURTON
Though the recent Burton decision upholds a pregnant woman’s
autonomous right to bodily integrity, the decision is not binding upon any 
state outside of Florida.  As the Burton case was ultimately decided by a 
Florida District Court of Appeal, its decision only established precedent for 
105. Wevers, supra note 98, at 436.
106. Id. at 437.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Burton v. Florida, 49 So. 3d 263, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
110. M.N. v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., 648 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
111. Id.
112. Burton, 49 So. 3d at 266.
113. Id.
114. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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the courts under its jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, other states can look to this 
recent decision as a basis for continuing to uphold a pregnant woman’s 
right to accept or refuse medical treatment, whether their decision is based 
upon religious, cultural, or merely personal reasons.  
VII. CHALLENGES THAT ARISE IN THIS
AREA OF LEGAL ANALYSIS
When researching previous cases that deal with obstetrical intervention 
and a woman’s inherent right to bodily integrity, numerous challenges arise 
which make it difficult to effectively conduct a proper analysis of the issues 
at hand.  One of the main problems is that there are not many published 
decisions to rely upon.  The lack of published decisions is probably the 
result of many factors, but the main problem is likely that there is not 
enough time for a judge to actually write the decision.  When a hospital 
files a motion to allow doctors to perform a medical procedure without the 
consent of the woman, it is normally under circumstances where there is a 
time-sensitive medical procedure at stake.  For example, in instances of 
court-ordered cesareans, if a doctor determines it is necessary for a woman 
to have a cesarean immediately in order to save the life of the baby, an 
entire lawsuit cannot unfold.  A decision by a judge needs to be made as 
quickly as possible.  Therefore, an articulate and expansive decision by a 
judge is not feasible.  
As decisions tend to be made in the moment, many are ultimately 
reversed through appeals.  A clear example of this is the Burton case in 
which the trial court originally made an emergency decision declaring that 
Ms. Burton could be compelled to comply with her physician’s orders 
based solely upon a phone conversation with the judge.115  This 
instantaneous ruling did not afford the judge ample time to efficiently 
analyze the facts of the case, resulting in Ms. Burton being forced to have a 
cesarean.  In the appeal, however, the court had both the necessary 
resources and the time to fully weigh the interests at hand, ultimately ruling 
that Ms. Burton’s initial autonomous decision to refuse medical treatment 
should have been respected.116  Despite the fact that Ms. Burton was 
successful in her appeal, for patients like Ms. Burton, the damage had 
already been done.  Thus, the appeals process proves to be ineffective in 
restoring a woman’s right to bodily integrity once it has already been 
violated. 
Another issue that may arise in researching this type of case is that 
documents or court orders are sealed, and therefore not accessible to the 
115. Wevers, supra note 98.
116. Id.
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public.117  Courts will sometimes decide to keep parts of proceedings 
confidential if they have a justifiable basis for doing so.118  Such bases 
often arise in the medical context.119  If a proceeding is made confidential, 
then any transcript made of the proceedings will be regarded as a sealed 
record.120  Moreover, potential violations of HIPAA prevent doctors and 
other hospital employees from discussing certain cases, such as evidenced 
with court-ordered cesareans with Somali women.121  It is likely that due to 
the personal nature of many of the cases involving forced obstetrical 
intervention, records are sealed, thereby making it difficult to ascertain the 
frequency of and reasoning behind forced obstetrical interventions.  
VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Despite the numerous challenges that arise in researching this line of
cases, viable solutions exist that would not only alleviate these challenges, 
but also directly address the problem at hand regarding the need to uphold a 
pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity.  One solution is to implement 
mandatory annual education sessions on recent appellate decisions in this 
line of cases for the obstetrics and gynecology divisions within hospitals. 
Doctors and nurses working in the obstetrics and gynecology divisions, for 
instance, should be well versed in the recent decisions in both In re Brown 
and Burton.  If they were provided with this knowledge, it is likely that 
these hospital employees would feel less inclined to compel pregnant 
women to undergo certain medical procedures.  Moreover, this may lead to 
doctors having a better understanding of different religious and cultural 
views, thereby creating more respect for their individual patients. 
Not only should hospital staff within the obstetrics and gynecology 
divisions be knowledgeable in recent appellate decisions, but judges 
nationwide should also be well-educated in these decisions.  Biannual 
judicial education programs should be mandated in an effort to ensure that 
judges are cognizant of the movement towards upholding a pregnant 
woman’s right to autonomy.  As cases in this area of the law tend to be 
complex, particularly when religion or culture play a role, judges need to 
be well-informed of recent decisions in order to distinguish between sound 
and invalid arguments.  Furthermore, it is important that judges have a 
comprehensive understanding of various religious and cultural views. 
117. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SEALING COURT RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS: A POCKET 
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The most effective solution, apart from mandating educational 
programs, is to have Congress, or each separate state legislature, pass a law 
explicitly stating that pregnant women have an inherent right to bodily 
integrity.  If a law actually existed that conferred upon all pregnant women 
the right to choose whether to refuse or accept medical treatment, courts 
and hospitals would no longer need to engage in a balancing test between 
the interests of the state in protecting the fetus and the woman’s interest in 
maintaining her right to autonomy.  
B. CONCLUSIONS
As the cases discussed above reveal, the courts have not reached a
general agreement in regard to the way they weigh a pregnant woman’s 
right to bodily integrity against the state’s interest in protecting the life of 
her fetus.  When religion or culture play a role in the decision or context of 
the medical decision at stake, the court’s interests appear to shift towards 
protecting the life of the fetus, ultimately making the woman more 
vulnerable to obstetrical intervention.  Though it is reassuring that some of 
the most recent decisions in this field of the law have ultimately upheld a 
woman’s right to choose whether to accept or refuse medical treatment 
based on personal or religious reasons, it seems highly likely that this issue 
will continue to arise as there has been no precedent established by the 
Supreme Court which is directly on point.  
The current challenges that arise in this area of legal analysis 
demonstrate that the nature of these lawsuits may continue to prove to be 
irresolvable, as decisions are made in a very short period of time without 
being given sufficient consideration, and documents tend to be sealed. 
Given this information, it follows that there are likely many more instances 
of court-ordered obstetrical interventions in the United States, yet the 
decisions are not documented or made available to the public.  
In conclusion, though it seems that a woman’s right to bodily integrity 
is being emphasized more heavily, courts need to establish, and 
consequently follow, a uniform procedure of analysis when approaching 
these cases, particularly when religion and culture are involved.  Should the 
proposed solutions listed above not be implemented, courts should look 
directly to the recent decisions in In re Brown and Burton and use them as 
models for upholding a woman’s right to autonomy and bodily integrity. 
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